


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Weekly Survey of Communist Military Developments in Indochina

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May 1, 1974

Sixty-First Report**WEEKLY SURVEY
OF COMMUNIST MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS
IN INDOCHINA*****(This report covers the period April 24-30, 1974)****The Key Points**

- No new infiltration groups were detected in North Vietnam during the past week. Moreover, COMINT suggests that Hanoi plans to send only one group a week south over an unspecified period, probably as a part of the new infiltration "phase" first reported last week.
- North Vietnam continues to maintain a large pre-infiltration training structure.
- Heavy fighting is expected in MR 3's Hau Nghia Province - Cambodia border area during the next few days as NVA 5th Division elements react to a division-size ARVN attack.
- Heavy logistic activity continued throughout Indochina during the week.
- North Vietnam received at least 22 MIG-19 jet fighters from China. This is the largest detected military aid shipment from China since the cease-fire.

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* This report has been prepared jointly by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense.

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Preface

This report is the sixty-first in a series summarizing evidence received during the reporting period of (I) Communist efforts to infiltrate new manpower and military supplies toward and into South Vietnam, (II) significant Communist combat activity, and (III) other developments affecting Communist military capabilities in Indochina.

DETAILS

I. Infiltration and Redeployments of North Vietnamese Personnel and Military Supplies***Personnel Infiltration***

1. The standdown in troop infiltration continued last week: no new regular infiltration groups were detected entering the pipeline in North Vietnam. Four new regular groups with more than 2,000 troops were observed in the lower part of the infiltration system en route to COSVN, but these groups previously were included in our estimate of infiltration starts as "gap-filled" groups. Twenty-one small special-purpose groups with about 525 personnel also were detected last week in the lower part of the pipeline. About two-thirds of these groups, consisting of 375 specialists, are moving toward COSVN.

2. The "new phase" of troop infiltration (see last week's report) may be quite limited in scope. On April 27, Headquarters, MR 559, reported that "southbound personnel would be received one day per week" at a communication-liaison station in Quang Binh Province, North Vietnam. The destinations of the infiltrating groups were not given, nor was the period of movement specified, although it may begin soon. After moving through North Vietnam, these personnel reportedly will transit the DMZ en route to their final destinations.

3. An analysis of the strengths of regular infiltration groups which have moved to the B-3 Front and COSVN since the beginning of the infiltration cycle last September indicates that their average strength was about 550 troops rather than the 500 previously used. This new figure now has been retroactively applied to groups destined for these areas for which either no strengths or very low strengths were reported. As a result, our estimate of the number of troops who have started toward the B-3 Front since September 1, 1973, has been increased by 500 (to 10,000), and the number who have infiltrated toward COSVN has risen by 1,000 (to 37,000).

Movement of Military Equipment and Supplies***North Vietnam***

4. For the second consecutive week, heavy ordnance shipments were detected in central North Vietnam. [redacted] logistic units near Vinh moved some 60 tons of ordnance southward, and another 70 tons of ordnance transited this area the next day. Similar supply shipments were

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[REDACTED]

**Comparative Starts of Troops
from North Vietnam, by Destination
September 1 - April 30**

	1972-73	1973-74
Total	86,000	80,500
MR Tri-Thien	26,000	2,000
MR 5	9,000	9,000
B-3 Front	14,000	10,000
COSVN	26,000	37,000
Southern Laos/MR 559	11,000	22,500

reflected in COMINT later in the week, in what appeared to be a steady flow of cargo, particularly antiaircraft ammunition, through this area.

5. Farther south in the Panhandle, between Quang Khe and the DMZ, heavy supply shipments also were noted. Most of the activity during the week involved barge shipments and totaled some 100-125 tons of cargo daily. As in recent weeks, most of the cargo moved was food, construction materials, and petroleum.

6. Although overshadowed by the large amount of supplies sent southward through the Laotian Panhandle, the North Vietnamese also have been engaged in a concerted supply effort this dry season in northern Laos. Since October, [REDACTED] the shipment of at least 3,300 tons of cargo to northern Laos, including more than 1,100 tons of ordnance.

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[REDACTED]

Although some shipments probably will continue for the next few weeks, the impending rainy season will certainly lead to a further decrease in supplies moving to this area -- logistic units in northern Laos are already making preparations for the rainy season.

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Laos

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8. Activity in southern Laos remains heavy, but logistic units are making increasing references to heavy rains in the Panhandle. By the end of May the rainy season should be in full swing in Laos, but it is still not clear whether the North Vietnamese intend to curtail supply shipments through this area. The improved road network in southern Laos if properly maintained will give Hanoi the ability to move significant quantities of materiel through this area during the summer, but it seems more logical that the Communists will use the western supply route in northern South Vietnam where more favorable weather conditions prevail.

South Vietnam

9. In northern South Vietnam, substantial shipments of ordnance were again reflected along Route 9 in Quang Tri Province. [redacted]

[redacted] the NVA 541st Engineer Regiment reported receiving at least 140 tons of weapons and dispatching nearly 500 tons of ammunition to the B-3 Front area. [redacted]

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[redacted] the 541st Regiment had at least 2,100 tons of cargo in storage awaiting shipment, some three-quarters of which were ordnance (see the transportation map).

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10. Plans for future supply shipments in MR 1 were also reflected [redacted] more than 3,300 tons of cargo, probably ordnance, are scheduled to be shipped to an unlocated storage area in southern MR 1 during May. This materiel will probably move along the western supply route.

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II. Significant Communist Combat Activity

11. Communist-initiated cease-fire violations continued at a high level last week, with a daily average of 109, the same as the previous week. Communist losses declined, however, from 119 daily to 116, while ARVN casualties increased from 31 to 40 a day. MR 4 continues to experience a majority of the incidents, mostly low-level ground actions and attacks by fire. MR 1 has registered an increase in Communist activity, the first since last October, with ARVN Regional Force clearing operations continuing in northern Quang Ngai Province, and with fighting for strategic high ground overlooking Route 1 occurring in southern Thua Thien. Heavier clashes also are taking place in MR 3 as a result of a three-pronged ARVN attack on elements of the 5th NVA Division in the western Hau Nghia Province - Cambodia border area.

12. In South Vietnam's MR 3, government forces launched a division-sized attack on April 27 against the NVA 5th Division in the Hau Nghia Province - Cambodia border area. In addition, ARVN units from

MR 4 are screening the Kien Tuong Province - Cambodia border area to prevent the 5th Division from possibly withdrawing to the south. The 5th Division has been applying heavy pressure to the Duc Hue Ranger Camp, located along the Cambodia border, since late March and had posed a major threat to GVN-held territory west of the Vam Co Dong River in Duc Hue District of Hau Nghia Province.

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III. Other Developments Affecting Communist Military Capabilities in Indochina

MIG-19 Deliveries to North Vietnam


13. [] at least 22 MIG-19 jet fighters flew from China to Yen Bai and Kep airfields in North Vietnam. The fighters, piloted by North Vietnamese, apparently flew from an airfield near Nan-ning in southeast China, the route used in the last MIG-19 delivery to North Vietnam in September 1972. Prior to this delivery, there were about 38 Chinese MIG-19s in North Vietnam's inventory.

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14. It is not clear why China decided to deliver the MIG-19s at this time. Peking has continued to provide military aid to North Vietnam since the cease-fire, but at reduced levels. The current delivery of aircraft is the largest military aid shipment detected from China since the cease-fire went into effect and may be intended to demonstrate Peking's continued support of Hanoi.

15. Traditionally, the multipurpose MIG-19 has been used as an interceptor in an air defense role. Since the beginning of 1973, Hanoi has made a concerted effort to improve its air defense posture - undoubtedly as a reaction to the tremendous destruction caused by US air strikes during 1972. Besides the recent MIG-19 deliveries, since the beginning of 1973, North Vietnam has received enough equipment for at least ten SA-3 firing sites and several new type of radars from the Soviets. In addition, North Vietnam has conducted extensive unit training exercises during the past year involving SA-2 and SA-3 battalions, as well as MIGs and antiaircraft artillery units.

16. The MIG-19 is also capable of being used in an air-to-ground role. No North Vietnamese pilots, however, have been noted conducting air-to-ground attack training using the MIG-19s. Moreover, North Vietnam already has about 100 MIG-15/17s, which are better suited for this role and in which air-to-ground attack training has been conducted.



Pre-Infiltration Training in MR 3, North Vietnam

17. North Vietnam continues to maintain a large pre-infiltration training structure. Recent communications intercepts reveal that at least nine "groups," as many as eight training regiments, and at least ten battalions are now responsible for pre-infiltration training within MR 3 Right Bank (one of the two commands in MR 3). Since January 1, 1974, at least 22 battalions have undergone pre-infiltration training there, bringing the cumulative total since mid-1968 to almost 210,000 people -- about one-third of the number of troops who have infiltrated since then. In addition to MR 3 Right Bank, five other commands in North Vietnam have conducted pre-infiltration training for NVA troops.

18. Historically, training units in MR 3 focused on North Vietnamese troops destined for South Vietnam's central coast and the southern half of the country, but during the past several months, intercepted messages indicate the scope of training has been expanded to include other categories of infiltrators. These fall into three basic groups: ethnic southerners who exfiltrated to the north and are now being trained as combat replacements; rehabilitated sick and wounded personnel; and "exchanges" -- an undefined category which includes both northerners and southerners. Although the proportion of recent infiltration represented by the above three categories is unknown, at least two combat replacement infiltration groups composed of South Vietnamese have been sent to COSVN since the beginning of March.

*Antiaircraft Fire Control Radar Probably
En Route to COSVN*

19. Infiltration Group 2082, en route to the COSVN area, was first identified as a "technical weapons group" on April 22. An intercepted message indicates that the group has at least eleven 57-mm antiaircraft weapons and probably one fire control radar. If the radar is confirmed, it will be the first time that a fire control unit has been detected this far south. The new radar may be a Fire Can or Whiff, models which originally appeared with Soviet forces in the 1950s and which have been used by the North Vietnamese since 1972 in Quang Tri Province of MR 1.

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Communist and South Vietnamese Regular Combat Forces in South Vietnam

South Vietnam

Regular Combat Forces

		MR 1	
VC/NVA ¹	RVNAF ²	VC/NVA ¹	RVNAF ²
183,000	372,000	84,000	103,000
	325th		VNMC
	324B		Airborne
	304th		1st
	711th		2nd
	2nd ³		3rd
	673rd AAA		Regional Forces


1. Includes VC/NVA personnel in ground combat, combat support, and air defense units and local force companies and platoons.

2. RVNAF Ground Order of Battle. Includes assigned personnel in ARVN/VNMC ground combat and combat support units, and Regional Force battalions. Although present for duty strength is no longer available, it is estimated to be about 85% of assigned strength.

3. Only one infantry regiment subordinate to the division.

MR 3	
VC/NVA ¹	RVNAF ²
39,000	94,000
9th	25th
7th	18th
5th	5th
377th AAA	Regional Forces
429th Sap Cmd	
69th Arty Cmd	

MR 4	
VC/NVA ¹	RVNAF ²
22,000	97,000
1st ³	21st
	9th
	7th
	Regional Forces



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